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ANTITRUST LAW 
HARD ROCK MINING AND ANTITRUST 
LAWS: WHEN TOO MUCH REALLY IS TOO 
MUCH, EVEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Bartholomew Lee· 
I. INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF 
ORE RESERVES 
"There is a principal of too much; phrased colloquially, 
when a pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered." So said the court in 
a recent tax case,1 but the country metaphor applies to mining 
as well. This is a note on the uneasy amalgam of antitrust and 
mining law. Antitrust law may well forbid what mining laws 
might otherwise permit.. Mineral ore can be monopolized 
through the aggregation of reserves and exclusion of competitors 
by litigation. Two recent Ninth Circuit cases, Clipper Exxpress 
v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., and Energy Con-
servation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc.,2 have extended the reach of 
the antitrust laws. This has special significance to the mining 
industry in the Ninth Circuit because of the court's unusual in-
terpretation of the law applicable to the aggregation of mining 
claims. 
This comment will explore the antitrust exposure which 
may arise upon the claiming of "too much" ore. An analogy will 
be drawn between mining law and United States patent and an-
titrust laws. The analogy is close, and in the proper case the lia-
* Adjunct Professor in Law and Economics, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, 
California; Admitted to California Bar 1973; B.A. St. John's College, 1968; J.D. Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, 1971. 
1. United States v. Dolese, 605 F.2d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1982). 
2. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1290 
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 1035 S.Ct. 1234 (1983); Energy Conservation, Inc., v. He-
liodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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bility quite large, which is of particular significance in the Ninth 
Circuit as the jurisdictional prerequisites of interstate commerce 
and standing are easily satisified. 
II. THE LAW OF HARD ROCK MINING 
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in a unique interpretation of 
American mining law. The court has consistently refused to ap-
ply the administrative "too much" rule to mineral ore reserves. 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the Department of 
Interior, and its administrative tribunal, the Interior Board of 
Land Appeals (IBLA) have long enforced a "too much" test. 
The "too much" rule holds that a mining claimant who has 
claimed too much ore may undercut the very premise by which 
he is entitled to make a claim. That is, the mineral claim must 
meet the test of discovery, locatability and marketability. 
Congress intends the business of mining to be as competi-
tive as any other business and courts have decided antitrust 
cases concerning the mining industry. What is unique about 
mining is that most minerals lie in the public lands, and the 
public lands are subject to a comprehensive scheme of federal 
regulation of mineral claims dating to the Mining Acts of 1856 
and 1872.3 These claims were administered by the states until 
the 1976 federalization of filing requirements under the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act." 
There are several levels of rights in mineral lands including 
the "pedis possessio" rights of a prospector, state mining claims, 
tunnels and mill sites protected by state and federal law, and 
the land conveyed from the federal government by a federal 
land patent. II Such rights, at whatever level, provide a holder 
with the right to exclude others from a particular piece of land 
through the remedies of quiet title, ejectment and injunctive and 
3. See generally Gage, Cry Wolf - Sherman and Clayton Are Coming! 27A ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. I, (1982). 
4. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976). The FLPMA, 
is also known as the Organic Act for the Bureau of Land Management. For a good sum-
mary of state and federal mining statutes and requirements for miners, see generally, 
ROBERT G. PRUITT, JR., DIGEST OF MINING CLAIM LAWS (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, 2d ed. 1981). 
5. See generally, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, Titles I-IX (Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Foundation, 1982), (hereinafter ALM). 
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damage actions. 
Whether valid mining claims may be aggregated to exclude 
potential or actual competitors from a relevant market in a min-
eral ore is a antitrust as well as mining issue. The question is not 
merely academic, because the larger companies in the American 
mining industry, particularly in their operations within the 
Ninth Circuit,S have aggregated huge numbers of mining claims. 
These companies assert that the ore reserves subject to their ex-
clusive use are worth billions of dollars. If these assertions are 
true, and the aggregations forestall competition in the produc-
tion of the ore, then antitrust violations may arise.7 
The test for discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit" is 
whether the deposit justifies the locator to have reasonable ex-
pectations of developing a paying mine.8 The Interior Depart-
ment has promulgated regulations to prevent the appropriation 
of minerals solely for speculative purposes before sufficient work 
has been done to determine whether a vein or lode really exists.s 
The policy underlying the "too much" rule is an estoppel. If 
there is "too much" of the mineral lying in the ground the very 
quantity of it reduces the value of anyone claim so that any 
single claim is no longer commercially viable.1o In this instance, 
the "too much" rule is known as the rule against excess reserves. 
The fact that a mineral deposit on one claim satisfies the discov-
ery standard, however, does not justify holding an entire group 
of claims on the mineral valid where the reserves on the claims 
are disproportionate to the total demand for such materials.ll 
6. These companies have acted with immunity to the "too much" rule. 
7. Upon a finding of antitrust liability the stockholders of any such aggregating min-
ing company might well wish, in retrospect, that they had suffered the application of the 
Department of the Interior's "too much" rule rather than application of the Clayton 
Act's treble damage penalties. 
8. 1 ALM § 2.4 at 163 (1982); the definition is based on Chrisman v. Miller, 196 U.S. 
313 (1905) and Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455 (1894). For a discussion of the none-to-
clear relation of this "prudent man" test to marketability, see 1 ALM § 4.80 at 705 
noting recent cases hold that mining claims may be invalidated upon a showing of no 
"present demand for the materials from the claim." 
9. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.3-1 (1974); 1 ALM § 4.13 at 611. 
10. The Ninth Circuit interprets mining law for most of the mineral rich western 
states yet does not apply the "too much" test. 
11. 1 ALM § 4.87A at 710.10. 
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The excess reserve rule limits the number of claims which a 
claimant may hold on the rationale that otherwise valid claims 
in too large numbers may fail to meet the discovery and market-
ability test for location of a valuable mineral. 12 The Secretary of 
Interior has stated that: "[I]f the market could not absorb the 
materials from all of the [excess reserve] claims, then the super 
abundance of the available supply establishes the absence of a 
demand from the claim in question."13 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed application of the excess reserve 
rule, which it dubbed the "too much test," in 1979 and found it 
to be "an abuse of discretion which was contrary to the existing 
mining law."14 Therefore, the mining industry within the Ninth 
Circuit may freely aggregate excess reserves without fear of suc-
cessful administrative challenge. 
In the Tenth Circuit, III the industry aggregates excess 
reserves at some risk, in that the non-use of a group of claims 
may be held to be in abuse of the claims process. IS In 1975 the 
Tenth Circuit17 held that if a mining claimant has held claims 
for several years but has not developed them, a presumption 
arises that the claimant has failed to discover valuable mineral 
deposits where the market value of discovered minerals was not 
sufficient to justify the cost of extraction. IS 
These issues came to the Tenth Circuit on facts indicating 
that the defendant did not meet the customs of miners, let alone 
applicable law, in making its discoveries en masse. The mining 
industry, in fact, may not be as fastidious as an assert concern-
ing its own compliance with the law.19 
12. ld. at 710.11. 
13. United States v. Osborne, 28 IBLA 13, 15 (1976). 
14. United States v. Baker, 613 F.2d 224, 229 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 449 U.S. 
932 (1980). 
15. See Miller, Surface Use Rights under the General Mining Law: Good Faith 
and Common Sense, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 761, 773 (1983). 
16.ld. 
17. United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 423 U.S. 
829 (1976). 
18. See Miller, supra, note 15, at 774. The Tenth Circuit's test is similar to the 
excess reserves rule. 
19. For example, a story is told of a helicopter foray to the mountains of Colorado to 
stake out new claims the very next day after release of official news of potential minerali-
zation in the area. However, there was so much snow on the ground that the would-be 
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Although the Ninth Circuit does not apply the "too much" 
rule to ore reserves, the antitrust laws, as interpreted by the 
Ninth Circuit, can reach the same result. Since the two recent 
antitrust holdings in Clipper Exxpress and Heliodyne20, it is 
now possible for adversaries to reach would-be and actual hold-
ers of large ore reserves, and present antitrust and treble dam-
age exposure against any mining company which seeks to en-
force its federal mining rights in "too much" ore. 
III. THE ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS 
The antitrust laws are the fundamental constitution of our 
economic system.21 The Supreme Court has called the Sherman 
Act the "charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free 
and unfettered competition. "22 
The antitrust laws, however, not only favor competition, 
they promote the interest of competitors against what Justice 
Brandeis called "the curse of bigness."23 Justice Black picked up 
discoverers of valuable mineralization would have been lucky to discover pine trees 
under the snow, let alone copper ore. See Summer, Wilderness and Mining Law, in THE 
LIVING WILDERNESS 8, 16, (Spring, 1973), as recounted in Strauss, Mining Claims on 
Public Lands: A Study of Interior Department Procedures, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 185 
(1974). 
20. Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1290 and Energy Conservation, Inc., 698 F.2d at 
386. 
21. Antitrust laws in general and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamen-
tal personal freedoms. The freedom guaranteed to every business, no matter how small, 
is the freedom to compete - to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster. United States v. TOPCO Associates, Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
22. "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on 
the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the 
greatest material progress, while at the same time producing an environment conducive 
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that 
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competi-
tion .... " Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4-5 (1958) (construing the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1974)). 
23. As trenchantly put by Justice Douglas in a 1948 dissent that later became the 
view of a majority of the Justices: "The problem of bigness ... can be an industrial 
menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing or putative competitors. . . 
Industrial power should be decentralized ... That is the philosophy and the command 
of the Sherman Act. ... " United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535 (1948), 
(C. Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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this theme in 1962 stating that the antitrust laws protect viable 
small businesses. U 
The inconsistency between promoting the efficiencies of 
competition on one hand, and the equities of protecting compet-
itors on the other, may be a major flaw in the character of Amer-
ican antitrust law. The court has swung between the application 
of these two philosophies and may again swing towards eco-
nomic efficiency at the expense of smaller competitors.2 1! 
American policy favoring competition in the minerals indus-
tries, including mining, has often been discussed in case law.26 
Courts of Appear" and the Supreme Court2S have noted the pro-
competitive congressional policy applicable to mineral lands.29 
It has been the explicit policy of American mineral law since 
the Gold Rush days to avoid monopolization of the nation's min-
eral wealth. California passed the Possessory Act of 1850 to pre-
clude the monopolization of mineral lands under the guise of ag-
ricultural uses. The intent of the legislature was to prevent 
monopolization of mining land and the anti-monopoly policy be-
24. "It is competition, not competitors which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to 
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, 
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It re-
solved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect 
to that decision." See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (con-
struing the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). 
25. For an overview of applicable antitrust law and these policy issues, see generally 
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW. §§ 103 - 113c at 7-33 (1978) (hereinafter ANTI-
TRUST LAW); see also Rosenberg, William Baxter's Antitrust Legacy, CAL. LAW., Apr. 
1984, at 29. 
26. See Cage, supra, note 3, who is particularly good on the cases involving the ex-
tractive side of the minerals industry, and Carr, The Int'l Energy Program and the U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 15 NAT. RESOURCES L. 503 (1982). 
27. For example, the Fifth Circuit has noted "[T)he public policy of the United 
States is directed at opposing the monopoly of federally-owned mineral deposits .... " 
McKenna v. Wallis, 344 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1965). 
28. The Supreme Court similarly analyzed the statute providing for leasing of min-
eral lands noting that Congress "[P)revented mineral rights, on pain of forfeiture, from 
passing into the hands of any unlawful trust or becoming the subject of any contract or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade ... Its whole policy seems to contemplate the opening of 
the public domain to competitive exploitation .... " Chapman v. Sheridan Wyoming 
Coal Co., Inc., 338 U.S. 392, 397 (1950). 
29. The present Supreme Court has even upheld use of outright public taking of 
private land "to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly." 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, _ U.S. _, 52 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4676 (1984). 
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hind the Possessory Act was often emphasized by the California 
Supreme Court.80 A later California case,81 emphasized that in 
early California mining law, no matter was considered more im-
portant than the limitation upon the extent of mining claims. 
Monopolization of, and restraint from trade in mineral ores 
has also given rise to the Justice Department and private anti-
trust cases. The famous Alcoa cast of 1945,82 dealt in part with 
the allegation that Alcoa had monopolized aluminum ore. The 
Supreme Court also dealt with ore deposits in Continental Ore88 
where it was charged that ore deposits were monopolized.84 The 
same ore monopolization also gave rise to another noteworthy 
antitrust case, in which the Tenth Circuit held that the defen-
dant's "took affirmative and effective steps to fix the prices for 
the raw ore . . . and to forestall and eliminate competi-
tion .... "811 The court went on to quote with approval Ninth 
Circuit holdings that "(t)he mere unlawful combination over a 
period of time to eliminate competition is proof of damage" and 
that any implied restraint of trade would patently result in some 
loss of business.86 Any mining monopolist in the Western Circuit 
Courts of Appeal therefore, faces a presumption that the fact of 
30. The [California] Possessory Acts of 1850 and 1852 (Cal. Gen. L 1850-1864, § 
6790 (H. H. Bancroft & Co. 1868». See also 1 ALM § 1.10 at 28, 29, Tartar v. Spring 
Creek Water & Mining Co., 5 Cal. 395, 398 (1855) and Smith v. Doe, 15 Cal. 100, 105 
(1860). 
31. Argonaut Mining v. Kennedy Mining & Milling Co., 131 Cal. 15, 63 Pac. 148, 150 
(1900), aff'd. 189 U.S. 1 (1903). 
[d. 
32. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2nd Cir. 1945): 
The plaintiff (the United States) attempted to prove, and 
asserts that it did prove, that 'Alcoa' bought up Bauxite de-
posits, both in Arkansas - the chief source of the mineral in 
the United States - and in Dutch, and British Guiana, in ex-
cess of its needs, and under circumstances which showed that 
the purchases were not for the purpose of securing an ade-
quate future supply, but only in order to seize upon any avail-
able supply and so assure its monopoly. 
33. Continental Or'e Co., v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
34. "The defendants were charged with purchasing and acquiring control over sub-
stantially all accessible vanadium-bearing ore deposits in the United States ... [and 
other restraints]." [d. at 693. 
35. Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 575 (10th Cir. 
1962). 
36. [d. (quoting Fox West Coast Theatre Corp. v. Paradise Theatre Building Corp., 
264 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1958), and Richfield Oil Corporation v. Karseal Corp., 271 
F.2d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 1959». 
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antitrust injury arises from unlawful acts. 
The cases demonstrate that mineral ores are a relevant 
productS7 subject to the protections of the antitrust laws, and 
that the antitrust laws reach restraints of trade and monopoliza-
tion of mineral ores,S8 despite the pervasive federal scheme of 
exclusive mining claims on the public lands.89 
IV. THE PATENT ANALOGY 
Aggregation of mining claims is similar to situations which 
arise when invention patents and enforcement litigation violate 
the antitrust laws.40 A patented invention and a patented mining 
claim reach the same result because ownership of a valuable 
property right is obtained by governmental action. An invention 
patent, like a mining claim, provides a certain exclusivity to the 
holder, by law, for the purposes of encouraging exploitation of 
the resource. However, if the holder of the exclusive governmen-
tal grant abuses it by using it to exclude competition from the 
whole market, or otherwise abuses its exclusivity, antitrust lia-
bility may arise.41 
There are several species of antitrust violations involving in-
vention patents which find ready analogies in the abuse of min-
ing claims. The first stems from the Kobe42 line of cases, where a 
patentee engages in a plan of monopolization by acquiring all 
present and future patents relevant to an industry or market. 
Even the good faith prosecution of the patent infringement law-
37. For a discussion of the parameters of the relevant market concept, see generally 
II ANTITRUST LAW, §§ 507 at 330. 
38. The Supreme Court has broadly defined mineral reserve geographic markets 
when faced with the issue in merger cases. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 
365 U.S. 320 (1961) and United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 416 U.S. 486 (1974) in 
Cage, note 3 supra. 
39. Company size alone may have antitrust considerations. See Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. F.T.C., 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 416 U.S. 909 (1969). See also 
Cage, supra, note 3, at 31, where it is stated that U[i)n an industry where deep pockets 
are part of the necessary uniform, the Kennecott decision must be viewed as just another 
example of the underlying resistance to the 'curse of bigness.' .. 
40. See generally III ANTITRUST LAW, § 704 at 114. 
41. See generally I ANTITRUST LAW, § 201 at 36. 
42. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 
837 (l952); Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied 423 U.S. 831 (1975). The author is indebted to the court in Handguards v. 
Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979) for its concise analysis of the patent/antitrust 
cases. 
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suit under these circumstances can give rise to antitrust liability 
if it infers restraint of trade. 
The second type of antitrust exposure derives from the 
Walker Process's line of cases holding that bad faith in the ac-
quisition of a patent can give rise to antitrust liability upon its 
attempted enforcement. A third sort of antitrust liability can 
arise as a counter-claim or separate action, in the Handguards" 
type of case involving a bad faith prosecution of a patent in-
fring~ment case. 
Fourth and fifth categories of antitrust exposure from en-
forcement litigation come out of the Otter Tail'" line of authori-
ties. These cases involve the restriction of access to a regulatory 
forum which precludes market entry. 
Each of these lines of cases has a direct analogy to possible 
antitrust cases involving aggregation and enforcement of mining 
claims. For example, a complaint may properly allege that a de-
fendant mining company aggregated mining claims for a "Kobe-
type" violation, thereby monopolizing a market. It may also al-
lege that some of the defendant's claims were obtained in bad 
faith, for a "Walker Process type" violation. 
A plaintiff can also allege that the defendant brought the 
enforcement litigation in bad faith, for a "Handguards type"46 
43. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 
172 (1965). 
44. Handguards v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979) and Energy Conserva-
tion, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1982). 
45. Otter Tail Power Co., v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Clipper Exxpress v. 
Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
103 S.Ct. 1234 (1983). Energy Conservation, Inc., v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386 (9th 
Cir. 1983). Each of these cases involved a single predicate case; for the pattern-of-cases 
language, see, California Motor Freight, Inc. v. Trucking Unlimited, Inc., 404 U.S. 508, 
513 (1972) and I ANTITRUST LAW, § 203b at 41. It is also noted that neither Clipper 
Exxpress nor Heliodyne are patent cases. Both, however, involve single state cases pros-
ecuted against a competitor as the predicate for antitrust liability. 
46. See Handguards, 601 F.2d 986. The court noted that: 
We are confronted in this case with the complex interaction 
between two bodies of law; One, the patent law, is concerned 
with the creation and exploitation of a statutory grant of mo-
nopoly power; the other, the antitrust law, is concerned with 
proscribing various kinds of monopoly power. Reconciling the 
interrelationship between the patent and the antitrust laws 
has long been a topic of concern to courts as well as 
9
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of case and further, that the enforcement litigation itself is ei-
ther part of a pattern, or even only a single case, that bars access 
to a market. Similarly, it can be alleged that the enforcement 
litigation is an abuse of process intended to eliminate or injure 
an actual or putative competitor, for an "Otter Tail like" 
violation.47 
The patent/antitrust analogy is compelling in the mmmg 
context because the analysis applicable to the interrelationship 
applies in other areas of antitrust law as well. The Ninth Circuit 
in Clipper Exxpress held: 
The fact that the Ninth Circuit cases involving 
enforcement litigation as an integral part of an 
overall scheme which violates the antitrust laws 
arise in the context of patent litigation does not 
intimate that such a theory is only viable in the 
patent context. We see no reason for refusing to 
extend the rationale of these patent-antitrust 
cases to overall antitrust schemes in other 
contexts!S 
The same relationship exists between mining and antitrust 
commentators. 
601 F.2d at 992. 
47. The process of reconciliation between antitrust law and other statutory schemes 
is all the more subtle for the Constitutional aspects newly coming to the fore. although 
not widely recognized in the patent/antitrust cases. The antitrust laws have long been 
regarded as of near Constitutional dimension. and invention patents are provided for in 
the Constitution itself. What is new. however. is the judicial recognition that going to 
court is itself of Constitutional dimension. being part of the first amendment right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances. Circuit cases such as Clipper Exxpress 
and Energy Conseruation arise within the "sham exception" to this Constitutional right 
to petition for redress by litigation. which litigation would otherwise be constitutionally 
privileged and thus never itself give rise to any consequent liability. 
The patent/antitrust cases do not yet face the constitutional dimension of patent 
enforcement litigation. The next issue is whether any such litigation must be shown to be 
wholly sham for derivative liability to arise. or whether enforcement litigation with any 
anti-competitive intent or effect. in the context of a government grant of monopoly privi-
lege. can create anti-trust exposure. despite contrary constitutional rhetoric in other con-
texts. See Energy Conseruation. 698 F.2d at 389. Also lurking is the issue of whether 
commercial litigation. like commercial speech. may enjoy less constitutional protection 
than its non-commercial counterparts. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Lowe. 725 F.2d 892 (2nd Cir. 1984) and Bigelow v. Virginia. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). both 
distinguishing commercial speech from political speech which is entitled to more 
protection. . 
48. See Clipper Exxpress. 690 F.2d 1264. 
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law. Mining law authorizes the exclusion of others from parts of 
a market, resulting in monopoly power. However, antitrust law 
implements competition as the policy of the nation and forbids 
the acquisition of monopoly power by protecting the interests of 
both actual and potential competitors. 
Moreover, in any mining dispute between rival claimants 
where one has acted to protect or further a monopoly or near-
monopoly position in a geographic area in ore reserves through 
"enforcement litigation" in state court, the scenario may fit the 
Ninth Circuit criteria and patent law analogies for antitrust 
exposure. 
The mining pig that does go to law, particularly in the 
Ninth Circuit, takes the risk that the law will find it a hog fit for 
slaughter inasmuch as "too much" really can amount to too 
much, at least when measured by antitrust if not mining law. 
V. PREREQUISITES TO ANTITRUST EXPOSURE: IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE PLAINTIFF'S 
STANDING TO SUE 
A. Mining Affects Interstate Commerce 
Many of the larger mining companies enjoy national market 
shares in the range of twenty percent of the several metals which 
they mine. Generally, however, these shares are insufficient for 
monopolization of the market. 
It is difficult to define a market for a metal in less than na-
tional, or international terms, given the low ratio of transporta-
tion costs to value. The situation for mineral ores, however, is 
different. The ratio of transportation costs to value is high which 
contricts the geographic market. It makes little sense to ship 
ores, except in special circumstances, and usually the industry 
refines fairly close to the extraction site. 
For the most part, the minerals industries are vertically in-
tegrated and do not buy ores in ore markets. Experience indi-
cates that it is cheaper in the long run, to internalize what would 
otherwise be the market cost of buying ore, by integrating up 
11
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stream to the mine.49 It is noted, however, that if integration 
itself adversely affects the market, it may constitute an antitrust 
violation. lIo 
It can be argued that a market for ore, given transportation 
costs, is so local as to avoid the reach of the commerce clause. 
Several early antitrust cases define mining as sufficiently local to 
escape the antitrust laws. Thus, even after conceding a twenty 
percent market share in a national metals market, any putative 
defendant can argue that its conduct, alleged to violate the anti-
trust laws, nonetheless does not affect interstate commerce. Yet, 
given the size and economic power of any national ranked min-
erals company, for any such company to claim that its activities 
do not affect interstate commerce is to ignore both economic re-
ality and the applicable authorities. III . 
The controlling cases are McLainll2 and in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Western Waste. liS McLain held that after identifying an as-
pect of interstate commerce "to establish federal jurisdiction 
. . . there remains only the requirement that [the challenged de-
fendant's] activities ... be shown as a matter of practical eco-
nomics to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate com-
merce involved."114 McLain states that the test for whether an 
activity affects commerce is whether any nexus exists between 
the activities of the defendant and interstate commerce.1I11 
The Ninth Circuit utilized both the "effect on commerce" 
49. See generally, R. H. COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, ECONOMICA, (1937), re-
printed in G. STIGLER & K. BOULDING READINGS IN PRICE THEORY (1952). 
50. See generally, IV ANTITRUST LAW, § 1000 at 207. 
51. See generally, I ANTITRUST LAW, § 231 at 227. 
52. McLain v. Real Estate Board, 444 U.S. 232 (1980). 
53. Western Waste Service Systems v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
Id. 
54. See McLain, 444 U.S. at 246. 
55. See Western Waste, 616 F.2d at 1095 n.1, where the court stated: 
It is axiomatic that a complaint should not be dismissed un-
less 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.' ... This rule applies with no less force to a Sherman 
Act claim, where one of the requisites of a cause of action is 
the existence of a demonstrable nexus between the defen-
dant's activity and interstate commerce. 
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test and the "liberal pleading" test in Western Waste.~6 The 
court stated that McLain held "that it was not necessary for the 
alleged antitrust violations complained of to have affected inter-
state commerce as long as defendant's business activities, inde-
pendent of the violations affect the interstate commerce."~7 
Therefore, the test would be applicable to any mining company 
with an approximate twenty percent market share in a national 
market. 
In Roosevelt Lake Log Owners~8 the court noted that 
"[j]urisdiction under the Sherman Act extends not only to activ-
ities actually in interstate commerce, but also to activities 
wholly local in nature that substantially affect interstate 
commerce. "~9 
In Roosevelt Lake Log Owners, the case involved the sal-
vage of logs on a local lake. The court identified the relevant 
aspects of the interstate commerce as the sale 9f Washington 
lumber and lumber products for use outside the state. Noting 
that ten percent of the nation's softwood lumber is partially pro-
duced in Washington State, the court held that the restraint, op-
erating locally on the logs, sufficiently impacted interstate com-
merce to provide Sherman Act jurisdiction.80 
The gathering of raw logs is an analogous to the mining of 
raw ore. Gathered logs are sold to local mills, much as ore goes 
to local smelters, sometimes after concentration or leaching. 
Logs are then cut and processed before going out of state, just as 
a mineral ore is processed and smelted before entering the na-
tional metals market. Just as a restraint operating locally on logs 
sufficiently impacts interstate commerce to provide Sherman 
Act jurisdiction, monopolization and attempted monopolization 
of mineral ore bodies affect interstate commerce in the metal or 
refined mineral itself. 
These cases make it clear that however local a restraint on 
mineral ore may be, interstate commerce is affected and the re-
56. [d. at 1094. 
57. [d. at lO97. 
58. Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners, 651 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1981). 
59. [d. at 1291. 
60. [d. at 1292. 
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straint is within the reach of the federal antitrust laws.61 Any 
defendant who argues that there is no restraint on interstate 
commerce, moreover, runs a risk of helping the plaintiff define a 
small but relevant geographical market. The more local the ef-
fects are claimed to be, the smaller the geographical market, 
thereby the easier it is to find antitrust liability.62 
B. Enforcement Litigation May Confer Antitrust Stand-
ing, Converting a State Defendant into a Federal 
Plaintiff· 
The key to antitrust standings in the Ninth Circuit cases 
has been that the plaintiff was injured in fact. It is not necessary 
that the parties be either actual or virtual competitors. For ex-
ample, in Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Pictures63 the plaintiff 
was not a competitor of the violator nor otherwise the target of 
the violation, but was nonetheless held to have standing. The 
violation was aimed at distributors of motion pictures; plaintiff 
owned the rights to a picture and lost profits when the violator 
"blocked booked" the picture with others of less demand in an 
illegal tie.64 
Standing, therefore, is clear for a would be competitor of a 
mining company in the same metal, who is excluded from ore 
reserves by aggregated claims and for would be purchasers of 
unproduced ore from the reserves. A more interesting issue may 
arise when a mining company ties up vast areas of federal land 
as claimed reserves in a particular ore, thereby excluding not 
only competitors in its own metal, but every other use of the 
land as well and certainly every other kind of mining.611 
A company that is monopolizing local ore reserves, practi-
cally speaking, also excludes others from any commercial enter-
prise on that land. This necessarily precludes any mineral explo-
61. In Roosevelt Lake Log Owners, the court refused to quantify an amount neces-
sary for impacting interstate commerce. However, in that case only $35,000 worth of logs 
were gathered by the single plaintiff. [d. at 1294. 
62. For example, see United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 
(1963) (Philadelphia and three adjacent counties held to be the relevant market.) 
63. 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970). 
64. Injury in fact may follow from proof of violation alone. See Union Carbide and 
Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 575 (lOth Cir. 1962). 
65. For a general discussion of principles of antitrust standing, see II ANTITRUST 
LAW, § 334 at 163. 
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ration and development for any other mineral: Tracts of land 
containing reserves of one mineral may also contain other miner-
als of marketable value. Not only are valuable minerals often 
found associated66 but the size of the aggregated claims is often 
so large as to embody areas of entirely different mineralization 
within the particular reserves. 
The question then arises whether a plaintiff who was not an 
actual or putative competitor for a mineral in a monopolized re-
serve may nonetheless assert a claim for its commercial injuries 
by reason of the monopolization, once it has been named a de-
fendant in a state court enforcement action for ejectment or 
quiet title with respect to the land at issue. Plaintiffs might be 
successful as long as antitrust injury to business or property is 
asserted and the violation is a cause in fact of that injury.67 
Cause and fact suffices only if the plaintiff can show that it 
has been a "a direct victim of a defendant's coercive practices," 
according to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Associated 
General Contractors v.California State Council of Carpenters. 6S 
The court now reads its prior standing cases to require injury to 
a consumer or competitor of the violator, in effect implementing 
a proximate cost test for antitrust standing. 
In Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,69 the' court denied 
standing to a union which was not itself a participant in the 
market for construction contracts or a direct victim of a coercive 
practices. However, it can be persuasively argued that any injury 
flowing from a antitrust violation, if sufficiently "direct" and 
proximate, is remediable. It must of course also be antitrust in-
jury, with detriments to commerce that the antitrust laws were 
enacted to deter. 70 
66. See, the table of typical parage netic relationships in L. J. THOMAS, AN INTRODUC-
TION To MINING, at 19 (Methuen of Australia, rev. ed. 1979). 
67. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1973). 
68. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, _ U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). 
69. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1979). 
70. The procedural context in which these issues arise is through enforcement litiga-
tion in state court, by the company with the reserves. In state court such companies are 
defending their "turfs" not only from others interested in the same metals, but from any 
other use of the federal land in which the claimed reserves reside. The effect on a state 
court defendant of a lawsuit for an injunction or ejectment is certainly direct, and if the 
state case is in furtherance of a federal antitrust violation, the effect is certainly coercive. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: USE IT OR LOSE IT 
The potential antitrust exposure arising from having "too 
much" ore is large, particularly for mining companies operating 
within the Ninth Circuit. Not only are treble damages awarded 
to the successful antitrust plaintiff, but the validity· of the 
claimed reserves will be open to question. Moreover, the ques-
tion is to be answered according to antitrust and not mining law. 
The vast mining reserves held off the market for so long by 
many companies may now be at risk. These reserves may be 
subject to exploitation by new claimants willing to invoke the 
federal antitrust laws to void the claims in the reserves, thereby 
re-opening the land to new claimants. 
Rather than retaining the power to forever exclude competi-
tors and others from valuable mineralization, large mining com-
panies with vast reserves amounting to market power in any ore 
may soon come to face the evolutionary imperative, imple-
mented by antitrust if not mining law: use it or lose it. 
The mining company brings the full power of state real property law behind it. More-
over, an antitrust violation defense is a tenuous one in state court. 
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DIGIDYNE CORPORATION V. DATA 
GENERAL CORPORATION: MARKET 
POWER AND SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Digidyne Corporation v. Data General Corporation,! the 
Ninth Circuit held that a seller's refusal to license its computer 
operating system software except to purchasers of its central 
processing units ("CPUs'T' was an unlawful tying arrangement, 
constituting a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust and 
Clayton Acts.3 
Defendant Data General Corporation manufactured com-
puter hardware and software. Its line of products included a cen-
tral processing unit known as NOVA· and operating system 
1. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Browning, C.J.; the other panel members were 
Alarcon, J., and Peck, J., sitting by designation). 
2. A CPU is simply an integrated circuit which executes computer programs. It is 
the central component of a computer. 
3. The federal antitrust law at issue in this case is section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which states: "Every contract, ... in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. ... " and 
section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), which states, inter alia: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in 
the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of goods, ... on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not 
use or deal in the goods, ... of a competitor or competitors of 
the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or con-
tract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding 
may be to substantially lessen competition .... 
The latter statute, which in literal terms refers only to exclusive dealing contracts, has 
been extended in application to tying arrangements. Moore v. Jas. A. Matthews & Co., 
550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing International Business Machines Corp. v. 
United States, 293 U.S. 131, 135 (1936)). The standard for violation under these two acts 
is virtually identical. Moore, 550 F.2d at 1214 (citing Fortner Enterprises v. United 
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969) (Fortner l)). 
4. The NOV A CPU utilizes the NOV A instruction set. An instruction set is the low 
level language with which the computer originates, and it is the only language which the 
CPU is able to understand. This language, also called machine language, is a binary lan-
guage, consisting of Os and Is, which indicate to the integrated circuit either an open or a 
closed switch. All higher level software must be translated into the machine's instruction 
65 
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softwarel! called RDOS, designed for use with the NOVA CPU. 
Plaintiffs, Digidyne Corporation and Fairchild Camera and In-
strument Corporation, manufactured "NOVA emulators," which 
are CPUs compatible with NOVA6 and therefore capable of us-
ing the RDOS operating system. Defendant refused to license its 
RDOS software for use with any CPU other than its own NOV A, 
and plaintiffs claimed that this refusal restrained competition in 
the CPU market.7 
The district court granted partial summary judgment8 for 
plaintiffs, finding that a CPU and operating system software are 
separate products,9 and that a substantial amount of commerce 
in the tied product had been affected by the tie-in. lO 
The triaPl was limited to the issue of whether defendant, in 
its tying arrangement between NOVA and RDOS, possessed 
set before it can be executed by the CPU. The characteristics of the instruction set de-
termine the compatibility of one CPU to another, as well as compatibility of a CPU to 
any particular operating system (an operating system will function with only compatible 
instruction set CPUs). 
5. Software, of which there are two types, drives the CPU. Application programs are 
those which perform a specific task for the user such as word processing. Operating sys-
tems software, such as RDOS at issue here, manage the internal function of the com-
puter and act as a bridge between the application software and the instruction set, which 
communicates with the CPU. A CPU cannot operate application software without an 
operating system. 
6. The NOVA emulators also use the NOVA instruction set. 
7. They postulate that potential buyers of their CPUs will desire to purchase the 
superior RDOS as an operating system (rather than inferior operating systems on the 
market), and that they will purchase defendant's NOV A CPU, rather than their compa-
tibles, because without so doing they cannot purchase RDOS. 
8. In re Data General Corporation Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1124-25 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980) (Data General I). 
9. [d. at 1105. The court came to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that a 
CPU and operating system software cannot function without one another. [d. Defen-
dant's own marketing practices supported this conclusion in that it sold the CPU with-
out software and in that its price list contained separate prices for the two products. [d. 
at 1104. Defendant admitted that it restricted the sale of its RDOS to those who also 
purchased its CPU, effecting the tying scheme. [d. at 1106. 
10. It came to this conclusion because defendant sold approximately 52,700 CPUs 
from 1970 to 1978, with a dollar value of $254 million in 1977 alone, and a "substantial" 
number of defendant's CPUs were then installed in the United States and abroad. [d. at 
1117. 
Summary judgment was also granted to plaintiffs on the issues of their actual dam-
age, [d. at 1117-19, and business justification. [d. at 1120-24. 
11. The trial lasted 45 days and focused on the definition of the tying and tied prod-
uct markets. In re Data General Corporation Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 801, 804, 
806 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Data General 11). 
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market power with respect to the RDOS ("tying product") mar-
ket, enabling it to restrain competition in the NOVA CPU ("tied 
product") market. Although the jury rendered a verdict for 
plaintiffs,12 the court granted defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict,13 holding that the evidence did not 
support a finding of market power. Plaintiffs then appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A tying arrangement is an agreement by a seller to sell one 
of its products14 only on the condition that the buyer also 
purchase another of its products,11i or at least agree that it will 
not purchase that product from any other supplier.16 Tying ar-
rangements which restrain competition are illegal,l7 They are 
12. [d. at 804. In response to special interrogatories the jury found that "defendant 
had power to raise prices, or instead of raising prices, to impose burdensome terms that 
could not be obtained in a completely competitive market or submarket," [d. at 812, that 
"defendant's operating system software was sufficiently unique that defendant had some 
advantage not shared by its competitors within the appropriate operating system 
software market or submarket," [d., and that there was "an appreciable restraint within 
the tied product market or submarket." [d. 
13. Alternatively, the court ordered a new trial. [d. at 821. 
14. This product is called the tying product, and is the one desired by the consumer. 
15. This product is called the tied product, and its purchase is usually undesired by 
the consumer. 
16. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5-6 (1958). 
17. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1558 
(1984). Tie-ins which do not restrain competition are not invalidated. For example, if 
seller has no economic interest in the tied product a tying arrangement is not illegal. 
Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977); Roberts v. Elaine 
Powers Figure Salons, 708 F.2d 1476, 1479-81 (9th Cir. 1983); Rickards v. Canine Eye 
Registration Found., 704 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1983). In addition, where the two 
products are available separately from other sources, a tying arrangement is not illegal. 
Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1558. Tying arrangements can be invalidated 
either by application of the per se rule, or by use of the rule of reason analysis. [d. at 
1556-57, 1567. 
Even though they meet the criteria to be found illegal, there may be some tying 
arrangements which are nonetheless justifiable. One acceptable justification occurs in an 
infant industry, where seller has a great interest in assuring development. United States 
v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per 'curiam, 356 U.S. 567 
(1961). Another is a tie-in which is necessary to assure utility of the two products, partic-
ularly where separate sales have led to voluminous customer complaints in the past. De-
hydrating Process Co. v. A.D. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
931 (1961). 
However, most justifications have been rejected. These include protection of good-
will, International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947), and qual-
ity control, where it can be accomplished by providing the specifications to others who 
are manufacturing the product. Moore, 550 F.2d at 1217; Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 
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proscribed because they hurt both customers and competitors.18 
Customers are forced into the purchase of an undesired, and 
possibly unusable, product,19 and competitors are injured by the 
failure of the customer to purchase their product.20 
One means of establishing the invalidity of a tying scheme 
is to demonstrate that it meets the requisite elements of per se 
illegality,21 which are: existence of a tying scheme,22 effect upon 
a substantial amount of commerce in the tied product,23 and 
market power.24 
Market power is the ability to force a purchaser to do some-
thing he would not do in a completely competitive market,211 
thereby controlling price and excluding competition.26 This is 
the essential characteristic of a per se illegal tying arrange-
448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). If it is possible to 
accomplish the end sought by the justification in another manner, the justification will 
be rejected. 
18. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1559-60. 
19.1d. 
20. Id. Customers fail to purchase competitors' products because they must buy 
them from the seller of the desired product to be able to purchase that product. 
21. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 499; Moore, 550 F.2d at 1212. 
22. A tying arrangement cannot exist unless there are two separate products, the 
purchase of one (desired or tying product) being conditioned on the purchase of the 
other (undesired or tied product). Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1563. For 
two products to be found separate, there must be a separate consumer demand for the 
purchase of the tying and tied products. Id. See also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1953) (purchase of advertising space in morning or 
evening edition of paper conditioned upon purchase of identical space in other edition 
not a tying arrangement because there were not two products as distinguishable in the 
eyes of buyers); Moore, 550 F.2d at 1214-15, Siegel, 448 F.2d at 48-49. A functional rela-
tionship between two products will not preclude their being found separate. Jefferson 
Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1562. See generally International Salt, 332 U.S. 392 
(salt machine and salt found to be two separate products although functionally related). 
23. A tying arrangement will not be invalidated unless it causes competitors in the 
tied product to lose sales amounting to a dollar volume which is more than de minimis. 
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501. See also International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396 ($500,000 in sales 
of the tied product was substantia!), United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) 
($60,800 was more than de minimis). The total dollar amount considered must include 
the total volume of sales tied by defendant's sales policy, not just that portion of the 
total accounted for by a particular plaintiff. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 502. 
24. Market power means sufficient economic power with respect to the tying prod-
uct to restrain competition appreciably in the tied product market. 
25. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1559. For instance, seller may force 
buyer to purchase an item he might not have otherwise bought, or might have preferred 
to buy elsewhere. Id. at 1558. 
26. Loew'8, 371 U.S. at 45. See also Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503. 
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ment. 27 Demonstration of market power presently requires an 
analysis of the tying product market to show the seller has the 
ability to force purchasers to buy an undesired product. How-
ever, when the per se rule first evolved, such an analysis was 
unnecessary, particularly where the tying product was found to 
be unique. 
In Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States,28 the Supreme 
Court found market power based solely on the uniqueness of the 
tying product.29 The Court did not analyze the tying product 
market to establish market power. The Court believed that the 
uniqueness of the tying product gave seller control over that 
product, thus enabling it to pressure buyers into taking the tied 
product, which established market power.30 
The concept of market power based on uniqueness was ex-
emplified in United States v. Loew's, Inc.,31 where the Court 
stated that market power could be inferred from the uniqueness 
or desirability of a tying product. 32 That inference would be 
strongest, and would give rise to a presumption, where the tying 
product was either patented or copyrighted.33 As a result of the 
inference, the Court concluded that in cases where the tying 
product was found to be unique, it is seldom necessary to em-
bark on a full-scale factual inquiry into seller's share of the tying 
product market. 34 
However, in Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel 
27. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 s.et. at 1558. See also Flinn, Tying After 
Fortner, 46 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 602, 609 (1977). 
28. 356 U.S. 1 (1957). 
29. 356 U.S. at 7. In Northern Pac. R. Co., the government had granted extensive 
landholdings to defendant railroad, which the railroad subsequently sold or leased. As a 
condition of the sale or lease, however, purchaser/lessee had to ship all commodities pro-
duced or manufactured on the land by defendant's railroad, although alternative means 
of transportation existed. [d. at 3. The trial court found that defendant's landholdings 
were "strategically located in checkerboard fashion within economic distance of trans-
portation facilities." [d. at 7. The uniqueness thereby attributed to these parcels of land 
in and of itself conferred market power. [d. 
30. [d. at 7. 
31. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). In Loew's, defendant motion picture producer conditioned 
the license or sale of one or more feature films upon the acceptance of a package or block 
containing one or more unwanted films. [d. at 40. 
32. [d. at 45. 
33. [d. at 45 n.4. 
34. [d. 
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Corp. 3~ and United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,36 
the Court realized a need to analyze the tying product market to 
establish market power notwithstanding the fact that the tying 
product was found to be unique.37 In Fortner I defendant credit 
company conditioned a loan for the purchase of real estate on 
the purchase, by buyer, of its parent corporation's prefabricated 
homes.38 The financing program offered by defendant was estab-
lished as unique and unavailable from any other source.39 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected plaintiff's argument 
that market power could be inferred from the fact that the fi-
nancing was unique and unusual.40 It explained that uniqueness 
confers market power only when other competitors are pre-
vented from offering the unique product themselves." The 
proper method of proof to establish market power consists of a 
study of whether seller has the power to raise prices with respect 
to an appreciable number of buyers in the tying product mar-
ket.42 The case was remanded to the trial court43 for market 
analysis, and was heard again following a verdict for plaintiff as 
Fortner II. 
In Fortner II, the Court interpreted the power to raise 
35. 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner l). 
36. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II). 
37. Fortner l, 394 U.S. at 505; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621-22. 
38. Fortner l, 394 U.S. at 497. 
39. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 614. Plaintiff's president testified that he accepted the 
tying condition solely because of its uniqueness, Fortner l, 394 U.S. at 504, and that he 
was unable to get comparable financing elsewhere. ld. The latter testimony was sup-
ported by testimony of the president of an unrelated finance company. ld. In addition, 
an expert witness testified that the fact that the loan covered 100% of the cost of the 
land and houses, that no guarantee was required of anyone with an interest in borrower's 
business and that the interest rate of the loan was only 6 %, made the loan so unusual as 
to make it inconceivable that it would be available from any other source. Fortner II, 429 
U.S. at 616. 
40. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505. See also Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States 
Steel: "Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be", 1969 SUP. CT. REV. I, 27. 
41. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505 n.2. The inability of competitors to offer the product 
is probative of market power because it may allow seller to exact less favorable terms of 
purchase from the buyer, who has no alternative but to obtain the desired product from 
seller. 
42. ld. at 504. Seller's ability to raise prices (without losing customers) is probative 
of market power because it demonstrates it has some means of leverage-otherwise pur-
chasers would turn to competing products. 
43. ld. at 506. 
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prices test to mean that seller must have power over price." It 
went on to explain that market power can be established only 
where seller has some advantage not shared by its competitors.411 
Consequently, if the evidence shows merely that a product IS 
unique,48 plaintiff has failed to demonstrate market power.47 
In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde,48 the Su-
preme Court upheld the validity of a tying scheme49 where a 
hospital maintained an exclusive services contract with anesthe-
siologists,IIO finding that defendant did not have market power.1I1 
The Court noted that, although market power may be pre-
sumed from the existence of a patent or similar type of mono-
poly because a buyer will be unable to purchase the product 
elsewhere,1I2 the tying product market must be studied in each 
inquiry into tying arrangements to conclusively establish market 
power. liS 
44. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620 n.13. The mere existence of even a large number of 
tying arrangements is not conclusive evidence of market power, unless seller could have 
raised the price, but demanded the tie-in in lieu thereof. [d. 
45. [d. at 620. An unshared advantage may confer upon seller the ability to raise 
prices because buyers will have no alternative but to purchase the product from it (e.g., 
it may be unavailable from any other source). See also Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: 
Comment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 40 (1978). 
46. Uniqueness does not per se confer upon seller the advantage necessary to 
demonstrate market power. In many cases, particularly where a unique product is pat-
ented or copyrighted, the advantage may exist (where, for instance, competitors are una-
ble to offer a comparable product), but this must be separately established. 
47. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621-22. See also Note, The Presumption of Market 
Power in Sales of Legally Differentiated Tying Products, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1305, 1310 
n.14 (1978) (the court's failure to find market power where United States Steel's "vast 
economic resources" likely gave it power in the credit market indicated its demand for a 
more thorough demonstration of market power). 
48. _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (1984). 
49. [d. at 1556. The Court declined to abolish the per se rule as applied to tying 
arrangements because of the length of its existence and congressional concern about the 
anti competitive character of tying arrangements but reasserted that not all tying 
schemes restrain competition. [d. at 1556-57. 
50. [d. at 1554. 
51. [d. at 1567. 
52. [d. at 1560. The presumption is apparently rebuttable as the Court summarized 
its discussion of market power by stressing the necessity of analyzing the market in any 
inquiry into the validity of a tying arrangement. [d. at 1561. 
53. [d. at 1561. The Jefferson Parish Court examined the market in which the hos-
pital sold its services to its patients. It determined that only thirty percent of the pa-
tients living in Jefferson Parish used the Jefferson Parish hospital and that control over 
thirty percent of the tying product market was not sufficient to give defendant market 
power. [d. at 1556. 
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A four Justice concurrence, written by Justice O'Connor, 
advocated abolition of the per se rule in favor of the rule of rea-
son analysis.M This analysis would apply once a tying scheme is 
shown to have met a threshold test which is similar to the three 
requirements for application of the per se rule.~~ 
As part of the analysis now required to demonstrate market 
power, the relevant tying product market must be defined. In 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,~6 the leading case on market 
definition, the Supreme Court determined that reasonable inter-
changeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand between the 
product and its substitutes would control in defining the mar-
ket. ~7 In addition, the Court warned that the market must be 
defined so as to include competing products and to recognize 
competition. ~8 
Once a market IS defined, plaintiff must demonstrate that 
54. [d. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., concurring, with whom Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and 
Rehnquist, J. joined). Under such an analysis, a tying arrangement would be invalidated 
only when its anticompetitive impact is found to actually outweigh its contribution to 
efficiency. [d. at 1574. A rule of reason analysis necessitates an inquiry into the tied 
product market, [d., and the use of a balancing process to weigh all surrounding circum-
stances, Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977), in a determination of 
whether the practice results in a "substantially adverse" effect upon competition. United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967). Where the practice both en-
hances and restricts competition, the procompetitive effects must be weighed against 
those which are anti competitive. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-54. When the net effect is 
procompetitive, or anti competitive but "insubstantial," the practice will survive rule of 
reason scrutiny. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
55. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1571. First, market power in the 
tying product market must be established. Second, there must be a substantial possibil-
ity of the seller acquiring market power in the tied product market. [d. at 1572. Finally, 
a coherent economic basis for considering the two products separate must eX-ist. [d. 
56. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
57. [d. at 325. The following factors were listed for use as indicators: industry or 
public recognition of a market as a separate economic entity, a product's peculiar charac-
teristics and uses, unique production facilities, sensitivity to price change and specialized 
vendors. 
58. [d. at 326. According to the Department of Justice, a market is a product or 
group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold such that a hypothetical, 
unregulated profit-maximizing firm, which is the only present and future seller of the 
product in the area, would impose a "small but significant and non transitory" increase in 
price (a hypothetical 5% is often imposed) above prevailing or likely future levels. 
United States Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines 4 (June 14, 1984). The Department's 
policy is to begin with a narrow definition which, if the hypothetical price increase would 
cause enough buyers to substitute another product that the price increase would be un-
profitable, would be expanded to add substitute products until the test could be met. 
The market will be the smallest number of products which will meet this test. [d. at 6. 
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seller has power in that market by showing that it has the ability 
to raise prices.1i9 That determination is a question of whether 
seller is able to raise its prices without losing its customersSo or 
causing new competitors to enter the market.s1 
The Ninth Circuit has considered the market power issue 
twice since the Fortner cases. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc.,s2 the Court held that defendant's trademark, registered in 
conjunction with its products and included on its packaging sup-
plies,6s was unique, which, with the existence of the tie-in, estab-
lished market power as a matter of law.s4 The Court relied on 
the Loew's opinion to presume market power from the unique-
ness of the product conveyed by the trademark,81i and read Fort-
ner I as supporting a presumption establishing market power as 
a matter of law.s8 
In Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & CO.,87 cemeteries required 
plot purchasers to also acquire grave markers and installation 
services from them. The Ninth Circuit analogized the facts to 
those in Northern Pac. R. Co., thereby establishing the requisite 
uniqueness to demonstrate market power.88 It distinguished the 
Fortner II decision by interpreting its tying scheme as price 
competition in the tied product market, an analysis inapplicable 
to the tying arrangement at issue in Moore. s9 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Digidyne, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's 
59. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620. 
60. United States Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines 4-5 (June 14, 1984). 
61. Id. See also Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1560; Fortner I, 394 U.S. 
at 505 n. 2. 
62. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). In Siegel, defendant franchisor required its franchis-
ees to purchase cookers, fryers, packaging supplies and certain mixes exclusively from it 
at prices higher than those offered by competitors for comparable products. Id. at 47. 
63. Id. at 46. 
64. Id. at 49. 
65. Id. at 50. 
66. Id. Consequently, no analysis of the market was found necessary. 
67. 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977). 
68. Id. at 1215. 
69. Id. But see Dam, Fortner Enterprises u. United States Steel: "Neither A Bor-
rower Nor A Lender Be", 1969 SUP. CT. REV. I, 9 (credit cannot be distinguished from 
other types of goods and services because it too can act to extend seller's economic 
power, thereby foreclos,ing competition in the tied product market). 
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reasoning that the NOVA CPU and RDOS were separate prod-
ucts and that the volume of commerce in NOV A CPUs tied to 
the purchase of RDOS was substantiaPO However, the Court 
ruled that the lower court erred in setting aside the jury's ver-
dict7l with respect to the remaining issue of market power.72 It 
reinstated the jury's verdict noting that it was supported by suf-
ficient evidence.73 
Regarding market power, the Court relied on Loew's and 
Fortner I, reasoning that theRDOS copyright conferred market 
power on defendant. It criticized the lower court for reading 
Fortner II as requiring some degree of market analysis for a per 
se claim," and stated that it would not review the record as to 
defendant's position in the tying product market, but only to 
determine whether the jury could have concluded RDOS was 
unique.7~ It distinguished Fortner II by reading it as providing 
that a'seller lacks market power where its product is unique only 
if buyers have the opportunity to choose between seller's fungi-
ble product and fungibles offered by its competitors.76 It found 
RDOS not to be a fungible product." 
The Court held that there was "abundant" evidence that 
RDOS was unique as a matter of law78 because its copyright pre-
vented reproduction by competitors.79 It found market power 
70. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1339. 
71. In the alternative, the court had ordered a new trial. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 1341-44, 1347. The Court found that the evidence showed ROOS to be 
distinctive and particularly desirable to many as weH as not readily reproducible. 
74. [d. at 1339. The Court stated: 
Most, though not all, of the trial court's reasons for setting 
aside the verdict are traceable to the court's view that the le-
gality of a tying arrangement must be tested by the seller's 
economic power throughout the market for the tying product, 
and by the relative substantiality of the restraint on competi-
tion in the tied product market considered as a whole. 
[d. at 1344. In addition, it went on to say that the district court was "misled by its 
conception that power throughout the product market for the tying product was re-
quired." [d. It is apparent from this language that the Ninth Circuit believes that a 
study of seller's economic power in the tying product market should not be done. 
75. [d. at 1341. 
76. [d. at 1345. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 1341, 1343. 
79. [d. at 1341. 
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based on this uniqueness by relying on Loew's,80 and by ruling 
that the copyright conferred an advantage on defendant not 
shared by its competitors,8! establishing market power under 
Fortner II.82 
The Court also noted that several of defendant's customers 
were locked-in to the purchase of RDOS,83 and that all RDOS 
licensees had to purchase peripheral hardware84 in addition to 
the NOVA CPU, or pay a program license charge which was lik-
ened to a penalty.81i Both of these facts supported the contention 
that defendant had market power.88 Finally, the Court noted 
that the mere existence of a tying arrangement established mar-
ket power.87 The demonstration of market power, as the final 
element necessary for the per se claim, determined the invalid-
ity of the tying arrangement.88 
IV. CRITIQUE 
In Digidyne, the Ninth Circuit declined to enter into an 
analysis of the tying product market, thereby disregarding Su-
preme Court precedent, beginning with the Fortner decisions 
and culminating with Jefferson Parish. 
80. [d. (citing Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45). 
81. The Court came to this conclusion because it found that product uniqueness 
presupposes the inability of a competitor to offer that product. [d. at 1345 (quoting 
Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
82. [d. 
83. [d. at 1342. Many of defendant's customers were original equipment manufac-
turers (OEMs). OEMs purchase an operating system and a CPU, with which they com-
bine application software to create a complete system for resale. The Ninth Circuit 
found that these OEMs were locked-in to the purchase of RDOS (rather than an alterna-
tive operating system) because their application software had to be modified to accom-
modate the operating system and it would be too expensive for them to change that 
software to accommodate a different operating system. [d. 
84. [d. at 1343. Testimony indicated that some of the required peripherals had no 
functional bearing to the software and that some which were superior and cheaper were 
available from alternative sources. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 1342-43. 
87. [d. at 1346. 
88. The Court also rejected defendant's argument that the tying arrangement was 
necessary to allow it to recover its substantial investment in research and development. 
[d. at 1343. For instance, there were alternatives available which would not restrict com-
petition. The Court pointed out that defendant could have sold RDOS separately, at a 
price which would reflect the research and development costs. [d. Recovery of invest-
ment costs had been expressly rejected as a justification for tying schemes. Jerrold, 187 
F. Supp. at 560-61. 
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The Jefferson Parish majority upheld application of the per 
se rule to tying arrangements,89 but ruled that market analysis is 
an indispensable element in consideration of market power.90 In 
Digidyne, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the RDOS copyright, 
the locked-in OEMs and the purchase of peripheral hardware to 
establish market power without a study of the tying product 
market is contrary to this ruling.9t 
It is unlikely that the RDOS copyright would confer market 
power on defendant. Even if buyers initially chose RDOS be-
cause they believed it to be superior,92 absent market power de-
fendant will definitionally be unable to raise its price without 
losing some of those buyers who would choose an alternative93 
rather than pay the increased price. However, there is no means 
of determining what customers will do without examining the 
RDOS market. 
The existence of the RDOS copyright will not act as a bar-
rier to the entry of new competitors into the market, even if that 
market were defined to include only RDOS.94 Although com-
puter operating systems may be effectively copyrighted,9& as 
with any copyright, only the expression is protected.98 Conse-
quently, anyone may examine such a program, take its ideas, 
89. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1556·57. 
90. 1d. at 1561. 
91. Analysis of the tying product market in the instant case would probably reveal 
that defendant had no ability to raise prices. In Jefferson Parish, defendant's control of 
30% of the market did not confer on it this ability. 1d. at 1555, 1567, and at the 
Digidyne trial, the highest estimate of the share of the tying product market controlled 
by defendant was 14 %. Data General's Supplemental Brief, p. 2. 
92. The district court found that there was substantial evidence that the alterna-
tives were equally or more attractive and often preferred by customers. Data General II, 
529 F. Supp. at 816. 
93. The trial court found there were alternatives to the RDOS operating system for 
use with NOVA and its compatibles. 1d. 
94. Obviously, if it included all alternative operating systems, the inquiry would be 
moot by virtue of the fact that many competitors had already entered the market to 
create the alternatives. 
95. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intern. Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983). 
96. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252-53 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Congress, 2d 
Sess. 54, 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670). See also Jones, 
The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
39, 41 (1978) (a copyright does not prevent creation of economic equivalents, which are 
almost always available in limitless supply). 
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and produce his own program accomplishing the same result and 
using the same ideas without infringing on the copyright.97 
Therefore, competitors are free to enter the RDOS market, not-
withstanding the existence of the copyright.98 
The locked-in nature of the OEMs also lends little support 
to the establishment of market power. Contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion, OEMs must be sensitive to the cost of RDOS, 
because it is tied to the cost of their systems for resale.99 If the 
price of RDOS rises, the OEMs will be forced to raise prices to 
their end-users rather than lose money, consequently losing 
those customers who are unwilling or unable to pay the higher 
price. 
In addition, the existence of alternatives to RDOSIOO dem-
onstrates that the OEMs will not bar entry of competitors into 
the market. Certainly there is a substantial number of customers 
not locked-in to the purchase of RDOS, for whose favor a new 
competitor could compete. 
The fact that defendant is able to force RDOS purchasers to 
also buy undesired peripheral hardware or pay a program license 
charge is more probative of market power. Such an ability is 
analogous to the power to raise prices.101 However, whether this 
97. The only limitation on the reproduction is that it not use the same expression as 
that which it reproduces. Formula, 725 F.2d at 525 (citing National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 1 20 (1979)); Franklin, 714 F.2d 
at 1253. 
98. If the existence of a presumption of market power based on a patent or copy-
right continues, under either the per se rule or rule of reason analysis, its weight with 
regard to computer software copyrights should be severely diminished, because the re-
producibility of copyrighted software makes it highly distinguishable from other forms of 
copyright where the actual expression is sought, rather than the process which that ex-
pression embodies. For example, in the Loew's case the copyrighted subject was motion 
picture films, which cannot be reproduced without either infringing on the copyright or 
changing the film entirely (e.g. using new script and different actors). Another example 
of this distinction is a literary work, where it is the actual words which are sought by the 
consumer. 
99. The Ninth Circuit postulates that some OEMs are insulated from price sensitiv-
ity because they have an effective near-monopoly for their product. Digidyne, 734 F.2d 
at 1346. Even assuming arguendo that there exist some OEMs who are insensitive to 
price, they could hardly confer on defendant the power to raise prices, because there 
would need to be many of them, not just "some." 
100. Data General II, 529 F. Supp. at 816. 
101. The purchase of unwanted or more expensive peripherals from defendant re-
sembles a raise in prices because 'it demonstrates seller has leverage to exact burdensome 
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ability is enough to confer upon defendant market powerl02 can-
not be determined without analyzing the market in which RDOS 
is sold. 
The Ninth Circuit also interpreted Fortner II as holding 
that the existence of a tying arrangement demonstrates market 
power. lOS This is clearly contrary to that opinion, which adopts, 
as "correctly analyzing" plaintiff's burden of proof, a commenta-
tor's analysis stating both that the existence of a tying arrange-
ment does not establish market power, and that the ability to 
raise prices must exist,104 
Application of the per se rule to tying arrangements has al-
ways been strained. Per se condemnation has traditionally been 
reserved for contractual arrangements which have no redeeming 
characteristics, and so may be invalidated without considering 
the market in which they operate. 1011 
When determining the legality of a tying arrangement under 
the per se rule, however, a court must find that seller has mar-
ket power and that the tie affects a substantial amount of com-
merce. Both of these findings involve a study of the marketplace 
which contravenes the purpose of the per se rule. lOS 
terms from buyers. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 504. 
102. In other words, whether defendant can demand the purchase of peripheral 
hardware without loss of customers or entry of new competitors into the market. 
103. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1346. 
104. Fortner 11,429 U.S. at 620 n.13. See also Flinn, Tying After Fortner, 46 A.B.A. 
ANTITRUST L.J. 602, 608, 612 (1977). 
105. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1556. For instance, price fixing 
which is inherently anticompetitive. See also Hollowell, Hyde: Exclusive Contracts, 14 
N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 75, 77 (1983·84) (under the per se rule, balancing the restraint on 
trade caused against benefits to customers and competitors is unnecessary). 
106. Under the per se rule, practices are conclusively presumed unreasonable "with· 
out elaborate inquiry 88 to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for 
their use," and the rule should only be invoked where a particular type of conduct is a 
"naked restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling competition." Northern Pac. R. 
Co., 356 U.S. at 5. The rule exists to avoid an "incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation ... to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been 
unreasonable." Id. 
Application of the rule shuts out analysis of the extent of market effect 88 well as its 
nature. Id. The degree of market analysis necessary prior to invalidation of a tying ar-
rangement is contrary to this traditional application of the per se rule. 
In addition, the fact that not all tying schemes are found to restrain competition 
seems clearly contrary to such an application, which is used to invalidate a certain prac-
tice because it would always be found to restrain competition. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. 
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Furthermore, when a tying arrangement does not fall under 
the per se rule because one or more of the criteria for its use 
cannot be demonstrated, a rule of reason analysis will be in-
voked to test its validity.l07 Consequently, defendants are likely 
to introduce as much evidence as possible with regard to the 
benefits of the tie-in,108 even in a case which is initially pursued 
on a per se theory. Once again, when this happens, the rule fails 
to effect its purpose.IOe 
Finally, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring 
opinion in Jefferson Parish, there are instances in which ties 
that may be quite beneficial are invalidated because under the 
per se rule the market is analyzed only to establish potential for 
restraint of trade, and benefits are not considered.llo 
The per se rule should no longer be applied to tying ar-
rangements. Because of the three prerequisites to its use and the 
analysis of the market involved in its application, it has become 
a legal fiction. The fact that it has been in existence for almost 
forty years, on which the majority in Jefferson Parish relies in 
part, III is a poor reason for its continued use. Our legal process 
must be flexible and able to conform to economic realities of the 
present, rather than remain entrenched in the past. In addition, 
the congressional policy expressing concern about the anticom-
petitive character of tying arrangements on which the majority 
also places reliance1l2 does not necessitate application of the per 
_, 104 S.Ct. at 1558. 
107. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1561. 
108. In providing for a balancing of pro and anticompetitive consequences of a prac-
tice, the rule of reason invites introduction of evidence by defendants supporting poten-
tial procompetitive effects. See also Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: 
"Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be", 1969 SUP. CT. REv. I, 34. 
109. Professor Dam pointed out two "practical objections" to the fact that the rule 
of reason may be invoked alternatively to invalidate a tie. He asserts that where a seller 
has not got market power, or where the effect on commerce is insubstantial, the effect of 
the tie-in must be de minimis and therefore not an unreasonable restraint. Secondly, he 
believes that where plaintiff is not granted summary judgment, the evidence introduced 
in connection with market analysis will lead to an extremely complicated trial. ld. at 33-
34. Both concepts illustrate the unworkability of the existing application of the per se 
rule to tying arrangements. 
110. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J. concurring, with 
whom Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J. joined). 
111. Jefferson Parish, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. at 1556-57. 
112. ld. at 1557. 
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se rule rather than a rule of reason analysis.1l3 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that establishment 
of market power requires market analysis, it has failed to ex-
pressly overrule its contrary earlier opinions, leaving the lower 
courts without a clear statement of the present state of the law 
on this issue. The dilemna those courts face is particularly exac-
erbated in cases such as Digidyne, where the tying product is 
unique, because it is with respect to this issue that the contra-
diction is most apparent. 
If the Court promotes the presumption of market power in 
the case of unique or, more particularly, patented or copyrighted 
products, and it determines that the presumption should be con-
clusive or that minimal market analysis will be necessary, use of 
that presumption should be curtailed to products whose unique-
ness truly can provide the power to raise prices or bar the entry 
of competitors into the market. For instance, in considering 
RDOS, such a presumption should hardly apply since a software 
copyright carries with it none of these characteristics. 
Regardless of the future disposition of this dilemna, how-
ever, it is possible that the lower courts will no longer have to 
confront the problem, because application of the per se rule to 
tying arrangements may soon be abolished, as it was upheld by 
only a narrow five to four majority in Jefferson Parish. Since 
this application is strained and has the propensity to create con-
fusion in the litigation process as well as invalidate beneficial 
tying schemes, this seems to be the optimal solution. 
Martis McAllister* 
113. A rule of reason analysis, where an involved study of the market is completed, 
will certainly invalidate any tying arrangement which is anti competitive. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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